SCOTUS Allows ICE to Continue Stops Based on Broad Racial Factors
In a divided order, the U.S. Supreme Court has paused a lower court injunction that limited the ability of federal immigration officers in the Los Angeles area to conduct investigative stops based on a combination of factors including race, language, and location.
The decision, issued on the Court's emergency docket, lifts the restrictions while the case proceeds on appeal. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion explaining his vote to grant the stay, while Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, authored a sharp dissent.
Background: "Operation At Large" and the District Court's Injunction
The case arose from a series of federal immigration enforcement actions in and around Los Angeles dubbed "Operation At Large". Plaintiffs, including individuals and associations, alleged that armed federal agents were conducting widespread raids at locations like car washes, farms, and day laborer pickup sites, seizing individuals based on broad profiles rather than individualized suspicion. The dissent detailed numerous accounts of agents allegedly using excessive force and detaining individuals, including U.S. citizens, with little to no initial questioning .
In response, a Federal District Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) after finding "ample evidence that seizures occurred based solely upon the four enumerated factors". The TRO enjoined the government from conducting stops where reasonable suspicion was based only on a combination of:
Apparent race or ethnicity
Speaking Spanish or English with an accent
Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash)
The type of work one does
The Stay: Justice Kavanaugh's Reasoning
Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence argued that the government demonstrated a "fair prospect of success on the merits" on two alternative grounds, justifying the stay.
Standing and Los Angeles v. Lyons
First, Kavanaugh argued the plaintiffs likely lack Article III standing to seek a broad, forward-looking injunction. He relied heavily on the precedent in Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983), where the Court held that a plaintiff who had been subjected to an illegal police chokehold did not have standing to enjoin the future use of chokeholds. The Lyons court reasoned that to obtain future injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show a "reality of the threat of repeated injury," not just that they have been harmed in the past. Applying that precedent, Kavanaugh argued the plaintiffs here have "no good basis to believe that law enforcement will unlawfully stop them in the future" and therefore lack standing to seek an injunction any more than an ordinary citizen would.
The Fourth Amendment and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
Second, Kavanaugh contended that even if the plaintiffs had standing, the government is likely to succeed on the Fourth Amendment merits. The key precedent here is United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), which established that immigration officers may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion that it contains undocumented immigrants. The Court held that reasonable suspicion is based on the "totality of the particular circumstances," and while "Mexican ancestry" alone was insufficient, it could be a "relevant factor" considered along with other facts. Kavanaugh reasoned that the factors enjoined by the lower court—such as being in a location where day laborers gather, working in jobs attractive to undocumented immigrants, and not speaking much English—could, when taken together in a region with a very high population of undocumented immigrants, constitute reasonable suspicion under the Brignoni-Ponce framework.
The Dissent: A "Grave Misuse" of the Emergency Docket
Justice Sotomayor's dissent argued that the Court's decision was a "grave misuse of our emergency docket" and allows the government to "seize anyone who looks Latino, speaks Spanish, and appears to work a low wage job".
A Different View on Standing and the Merits
The dissent strongly disagreed with Kavanaugh's application of precedent. Sotomayor argued this case is factually distinct from Lyons because the District Court found evidence of a systematic government "pattern of conduct" with "approval or authorization" from officials, which created a "real and immediate threat" that the plaintiffs would be stopped again while simply going to work.
On the Fourth Amendment question, Sotomayor contended that the government's approach violates core constitutional principles. Relying on cases like Reid v. Georgia (1980), she argued that a set of facts cannot create reasonable suspicion if it "describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent" people. Given that nearly half the population of the Central District of California identifies as Hispanic or Latino and a majority speak a language other than English at home, the four factors are overly broad generalizations that lack the "individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires".
The Balance of Harms
Finally, the dissent argued that the balance of harms and equities lies with the plaintiffs, not the government. While Kavanaugh focused on the government's interest in enforcing the law, Sotomayor highlighted the harm to the community, stating, "United States citizens are also being seized, taken from their jobs, and prevented from working". The concurrence, she wrote, "improperly shifts the burden onto an entire class of citizens to carry enough documentation to prove that they deserve to walk freely".
Analysis and Implications
The Court's order immediately lifts the restrictions on DHS, allowing its agents to again use the challenged factors as the sole basis for reasonable suspicion while the litigation continues. The sharply divided opinions highlight a fundamental clash over the balance between law enforcement discretion in immigration enforcement and the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures.
The decision also adds fuel to the ongoing debate about the Court's use of its emergency docket, often called the "shadow docket." Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for issuing an "entirely unexplained" order that circumvents the normal appeals process and leaves lower courts to guess the majority's reasoning. While the case now returns to the Ninth Circuit for full consideration, the Supreme Court has sent a strong signal about how it is likely to rule if the case returns.
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